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Comments
INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY
Under Trial Rules 6 and 7 of the new Rules several
different methods may be used by the Court in submitting
the case to the jury. In order to illustrate these methods
and permit a comparison between them, the Editors pres-
ent below examples of how each method might be applied
to the same typical case. The case selected is Merrick v.
United Railways Company, 163 Md. 641 (1933) in which
the lower Court was affirmed.
The facts in this case as shown by the record were
briefly as follows: The plaintiff was driving his automobile
north on Broadway, just above Fleet Street, looking for
a place to park. There was a parking space of triangular
shape between the northbound and southbound tracks on
Broadway, about 100 or 125 feet north of Fleet Street, and
plaintiff was endeavoring to get his car into an empty
space west of the northbound track when the accident
occurred. The defendant's street car had left Fleet Street,
and was proceeding north just before the accident occurred.
The front of defendant's street car struck the left side
of plaintiff's automobile at an angle of about forty-five
degrees, doing some damage to the automobile and injur-
ing the plaintiff. Both sides agreed that the trolley's bell
was ringing all the way from Fleet Street. The plaintiff
claimed that he had just turned north into Broadway from
Fleet Street, proceeded 75 to 100 feet north on the north-
bound track; seeing a space open, he stopped, backed, went
forward, and backed again across the track. When just
about to go ahead into the parking space, he was struck
by the trolley, which, when he started the parking maneu-
ver, had been standing still at Fleet Street, at least seventy-
five feet away. The defendant's story, on the other hand,
was that while the trolley was proceeding north, after leav-
ing Fleet Street, plaintiff, who had been to its right and a
little ahead of it, suddenly, and without warning, made
a left turn across the track, and was struck before the
trolley could be stopped.
Three forms of submitting the case are illustrated.
First are printed the prayers actually granted in the case
and given to the jury according to the record in the case.
Second is a suggested oral charge which attempts to incor-
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porate in simple language the essence of the granted
prayers. In order to keep it short, very little summing up
of the facts has been included and, of course, the extent
to which this power is used will depend on the individual
judge. Third there is presented a suggested charge in
connection with special questions on particular issues in
place of the general verdict. As pointed out below, an
ordinary negligence case, like the present one, does not
bring out the basic advantages of special questions, and
is used here primarily to indicate the method of their use.
The Editors do not pretend that the suggested charges
are by any means perfect or models. Indeed as has already
been said they do not exercise the power of the judge to
sum up the evidence to the extent which many might
think desirable. They are presented solely for the purpose
of promoting a better understanding of the various avail-
able methods and inducing discussions and comparison
among the members of the bench and bar.
1. WRMTEN PRAYERS
Plaintiff's No. 1 Prayer
The Jury are instructed that if they shall find a verdict
for the Plaintiff, then in estimating the damages they are
to consider the health and condition of the Plaintiff before
the injury complained of as compared with his present
condition in consequence of said injury, and whether the
same is in its nature permanent and how far, if at all, it
is calculated to disable him from engaging in those employ-
ments for which in the absence of said injury he would
be qualified and also the physical and mental suffering,
if any, to which he was subjected by reason of said injury,
and to allow the Plaintiff such damages as in the opinion
of the Jury will be a fair and just compensation for the
injury which he has sustained; and they shall also award
the Plaintiff as damages such sums as they shall find from
the evidence represents the reasonable cost of repairing
the damage to the automobile of the Plaintiff caused by
said accident.
Plaintiff's No. 2 Prayer
The Jury are instructed that if they shall find from
the evidence that on or about the 6th day of September,
1930, the Plaintiff, using due care and caution, was driving
an automobile northerly on Broadway, at or about its
intersection with Fleet Street, and that the automobile
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which the Plaintiff was driving was run into, struck
against, or collided with by a street car of the Defend-
ant, which was then and there being operated by the De-
fendant, its agents or servants northerly on Broadway, at
or about its intersection with Fleet Street, in a reckless,
careless and negligent manner, if the Jury so find, and if
they further find that the Plaintiff was injured and his
automobile damaged as a result of said collision and that
said injuries and damages resulted directly from the fail-
ure to exercise ordinary care and prudence on the part
of the Defendant, its agents and servants, and not from
the failure on the part of the Plaintiff to exercise ordinary
care and prudence directly contributing unto said acci-
dent, then their verdict must be for the Plaintiff.
Court's Instruction In Lieu Of Plaintiff's Rejected
Third Prayer
The Court instructs the Jury that if they shall find
from the evidence that prior to the actual collision the
Plaintiff was proceeding northerly in the Defendant's
tracks and was in front of the Defendant's street car, as
testified by him, and that he attempted to turn into the
parking space, as testified to by him, and then backed
his car out upon the Defendant's tracks, as testified to by
him, and then attempted to go forward into said parking
space and while so doing was struck by the Defendant's
street car, and that the motorman of the Defendant's street
car by the exercise of ordinary care could have seen the
Plaintiff executing said maneuvers while he, the said
motorman, was sufficiently far away with his street car
to have avoided colliding with the Plaintiff's car, then their
verdict shall be for the Plaintiff.
Plaintiff's No. 4 Prayer
The Jury are instructed that a street car has not a right
of way on its tracks paramount to that of an ordinary
vehicle, neither has a right superior to that of the other,
but each must exercise its right to use the street with
due regard to the rights of the other.
Plaintiff's No. 5 Prayer
The Jury are instructed that it is incumbent upon the
operator of a street railway car to operate it at such a
speed, to have it under such control, and to give such
1941]
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warning of its approach, as will enable him by the exercise
of ordinary care under the circumstances existing at the
time to avoid injury to others who may be also in the
lawful use of the street.
Defendant's No. 1 Prayer
The Court instructs the Jury that there can be no re-
covery in this action against defendant, Railways Company,
unless the Jury find from the evidence that the plaintiff
has affirmatively shown by a fair preponderance of evi-
dence that the accident was caused through the negligence
of the motorman of the street car and the Jury are in-
structed in determining whether or not the motorman was
guilty of negligence that the law makes no unreasonable
demand and that it will not consider him guilty of culpable
negligence in failing to take precautions which in the opin-
ion of the jury no other man of ordinary prudence would
have taken under the circumstances.
Defendant's No. 5 Prayer
The Court instructs the Jury that if they find from the
evidence in this case that the defendant's street car was
proceeding north on Broadway, and that the plaintiff's
automobile was also proceeding north on Broadway to
the east of the street-car track, if they so find, and find
that there was ample room for the street car and the auto-
mobile to pass by each other without striking, if each had
continued on in the same direction, and if they further
find that as the car and the automobile were proceeding
in this manner, the plaintiff moved his automobile sud-
denly towards, and in front of the street car and so sud-
denly that the motorman was unable by the exercise of
ordinary care to stop the car in time to avoid the accident,
then their verdict must be for the defendant.
Defendant's No. 7 Prayer.
The Court instructs the Jury that it is the duty of the
driver of an automobile before crossing a street railway
track to look to see if a car is approaching, and if the jury
shall find from the evidence that the plaintiff did not look
before crossing the track, and shall further find that if he
had looked he could by the use of ordinary and reason-
able care have prevented the accident complained of, if
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the jury so find, then his negligence directly contributed
to the accident, and there can be no recovery in this case,
and their verdict must be for the defendant.
Defendant's No. 9 Prayer.
The Court instructs the Jury that if they shall find from
the evidence that the accident in question could have been
avoided by the exercise of ordinary care and caution on
the part of the plaintiff, the plaintiff is not entitled to
recover.
Defendant's No. 10 Prayer.
The Court instructs the Jury that if they shall find
from the evidence that the plaintiff was careless in the
way he drove his automobile and that such carelessness
on his part was the direct and proximate cause of the acci-
dent, if the jury so find, then their verdict must be for the
defendant, Railways Company.
Defendant's No. 14 Prayer.
The Court instructs the jury that the burden of proof
is upon the plaintiff to show by the weight of the evidence
that the injury was caused by the negligence on the part
of the motorman of the street car, and unless the jury
shall find that it has been shown by the weight of the evi-
dence that the injuries were caused by the negligence of
the motorman, their verdict must be for the defendant
Railways Company.
Defendant's No. 15 Prayer.
The Court instructs the jury that the burden of estab-
lishing by a preponderance of proof satisfactory to them,
the state of facts alleged in the declaration, rests upon the
plaintiff; and if the evidence in this case should be such as
to leave the minds of the jury in a state of even balance
as to the truth of the state of facts alleged in the declara-
tion, the verdict must be for the defendant, Railways
Company.
Defendant's No. 16 Prayer.
The Court instructs the jury that even if the verdict
should be for the plaintiff, they are to allow him only such
damages as in their opinion have been affirmatively proved,
1941]
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with reasonable certainty, to have resulted as the natural,
proximate and direct effect of the accident complained of
by him, the jury are not to go into the field of mere proba-
bilities or to engage in conjecture or speculation.
The Defendant is not to be held responsible for any
ailments which the plaintiff may suffer, which resulted
from any other cause than the accident mentioned in the
evidence.
Defendant's No. 17 Prayer.
The Court instructs the jury that the burden of estab-
lishing by a preponderance of proof satisfactory to the
jury that the plaintiff received in the accident mentioned
in the evidence, the injuries and damage which the plaintiff
alleges, rests upon the plaintiff.
2. ORAL CHARGE
"Gentlemen of the Jury:
"In giving you my instructions on this case, I wish to
emphasize that although what I shall say about the law
is binding upon you, and you must follow it in reaching
your verdict, nevertheless what I shall say about the facts
and about the witnesses, is purely advisory, and not in
any way binding upon you. It is your function to decide
upon the truth of the testimony, as given by the various
witnesses, and whatever I say on the facts will be only for
the purpose of making the issues clearer, and not with any
idea of influencing your decision on them. That is your
responsibility.
"In the present case, there are three principal questions
for you to decide in reaching your verdict. First, was the
accident caused by the negligence of the defendant; second,
did the negligence of the plaintiff also contribute to the
accident; and third, did the defendant have the last clear
chance to avoid the accident, notwithstanding any negli-
gence of the plaintiff.
"The plaintiff says that he came east on Fleet Street and
turned north on Broadway in order to find a place to park
his car; that he drove north on the car tracks for approxi-
mately one hundred and fifty feet, and then saw a free
parking space on his left in the area between the north
and southbound tracks which, at that point, are some dis-
tance apart on account of the market. He turned the nose
of his automobile towards the empty parking space, and
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proceeded to go forward and backward on the tracks in
order to get into it, when he was suddenly struck by a
street car which came north from Fleet Street, and collided
with the left side of his automobile. The collision
damaged his automobile, and injured him personally. He
says that he knew the car was coming, because he had seen
it in his mirror, but when he started his manoeuvers of
parking, the street car was some distance away, and al-
though he heard the bell of the street car being rung, he
says he had ample time to park before the car
reached him, or the trolley car had ample time to stop after
he had started to park.
"The story told by the motorman is entirely different.
It is simply that while the motorman was proceeding north
on Broadway, the plaintiff was ahead of him and a little
to the right; that suddenly, and without any warning, the
plaintiff cut across to the left in front of the street car when
the motorman had no time to stop, and the trolley car col-
lided with the automobile.
"It is for you to decide which of these two conflicting
stories is correct, and by your verdict to say which of the
parties was negligent. Negligence is lack of ordinary care
under all the circumstances. It is the failure to act with
the care which a reasonable and prudent man would have
used under the same conditions.
"To be more specific, it is the duty of all persons using
the streets to conduct themselves prudently and act with
ordinary care. The Railway Company owed it to the plain-
tiff to operate its cars with reasonable care, and if you be-
lieve that the trolley car involved in this accident was
operated at an excessive speed, or otherwise imprudently,
then the defendant was negligent. On the other hand, it is
the duty of a motorist to drive with ordinary care, and it
is negligent for an automobile carelessly to make a sharp
turn across the path of a trolley car going in the same
direction at such a time as to give the motorman no oppor-
tunity to stop it before a collision, when the motorman
is operating carefully. If you find that this is what hap-
pened, then the motorist was negligent.
"If the defendant was negligent, and his negligence alone
caused the accident, then the defendant is liable; if the ac-
cident was caused by the negligence of both the plaintiff
and the defendant, then the plaintiff was contributorily
negligent, and the defendant is not liable. It makes no
difference whether the plaintiff was only slightly negli-
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gent, or was very negligent, for the law does not compare
quantities of negligence. Even if you find that the plain-
tiff was only slightly negligent, your verdict must be for
the defendant. On the other hand, if you find that the
accident was caused solely by the negligence of the de-
fendant, then your verdict should be for the plaintiff.
"There is a third possibility which you may find as the
real cause of the accident. Even though the plaintiff him-
self was negligent before the accident in placing his auto-
mobile across the street car tracks, there may still have
been time for the motorman to have stopped before run-
ning into him. It may be that with ordinary care the
motorman should have seen that the plaintiff was in a
dangerous position which he could not get out of in time,
and that if the motorman had used ordinary care he could
have stopped the trolley car before the collision. If you
believe that the motorman had such a last chance to avoid
the accident, but failed to take it, then you may find a
verdict for the plaintiff. The reason for this is that the
accident would not have been caused by the negligence of
the plaintiff and the negligence of the defendant acting
together, but only by the negligence of the defendant after
a new situation had arisen.
"In deciding which story you believe, and in making up
your minds as to what actually happened, you are entitled
to use your experience as intelligent men, and to judge
the testimony of the witnesses as you would judge matters
in which you yourself are interested. In other words, you
can take into consideration what the witnesses say; its
probability; their manner in saying it, and your under-
standing of the whole situation. You do not have to be
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt, but in order to ac-
cept the story of the one who has the burden of proof, you
must be convinced that there is more persuasive evidence
for it than against it.
"The first burden of proof in this case is on the plaintiff.
He has charged that the defendant's motorman was negli-
gent, and he must prove that negligence by the greater
weight of the evidence. The weight of the evidence is not
measured by the number of witnesses, or by any particular
circumstance. It means simply that the evidence of one
party must carry more conviction to your minds than that
of the other party, so that if you can not make up your
minds as to which story is the more convincing, you must
decide as though the point in question had not been proved.
If, for example, you can not make up your minds whether
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the motorman was negligent or not, then you must decide
that he was not.
"On the other hand, the burden of proving that the plain-
tiff himself was contributorily negligent is on the defend-
ant. In order to defeat a recovery on this ground, the de-
fendant must convince you by the greater weight of the
evidence that the plaintiff's own negligence contributed
to this accident.
"Finally, on the question of whether the motorman had
a last clear chance to avoid the accident by ordinary care,
notwithstanding previous conduct of the plaintiff, the
burden of proof is on the plaintiff. To permit him to re-
cover on that theory, the plaintiff must convince you by
the greater weight of the evidence that the motorman had
such a last clear chance to prevent the accident, and failed
to take advantage of it.
"If your verdict should be for the plaintiff, in fixing the
damages you may consider the following items:
"The plaintiff's health before the accident as compared
with since; whether his injury has affected his earning
capacity, and whether it will be permanent. You may
also allow him for his medical expenses, and the damage
to his automobile, on both of which points there is testi-
mony in the case. Finally, you may allow him such
amount as you think proper for the pain and suffering
which he has endured. The law gives no exact measure
for pain and suffering, and you must fix the damages, in-
cluding that item, in such amount as you think fair to both
parties.
"I would summarize my instructions by saying this:
If you believe that this accident was caused solely by the
negligence of the motorman, find a verdict for the plain-
tiff. If you believe that the accident was caused solely by
the negligence of the plaintiff, or by a combination of the
negligence of the plaintiff and the defendant, at the same
time, find a verdict for defendant. If you believe that even
though the plaintiff may have been negligent at some time
before the accident, neverthless, the motorman had a last
clear chance to avoid the accident then find a verdict for
the plaintiff.
"I will now ask counsel to come into my chambers to
discuss any other instructions before they make their argu-
ments to you."
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3. SPECIAL IssuEs WITH ORAL CHARGE
For the sake of simplicity the same case is used below
to illustrate how special issues may be submitted to the
jury. But while this example indicates the method of
doing so, the case does not show the real advantages of
the use of special questions. Their primary purpose is
not, as some think, to check or curtail the jury, but to
simplify its functions in difficult cases and to avoid retrials
for errors. Consequently in the ordinary negligence case
which can usually be submitted clearly and directly on
oral instructions with a general verdict, special questions
are not of great value. They are much more helpful in
cases where the legal principles are complex or doubtful
but the facts simple or fairly clear. Under some circum-
stances, however, even in negligence cases they may be
useful. For example if there is doubt whether the evidence
of a "last clear chance" is sufficient to go to the jury,
special questions may save a retrial. If the issue of a last
clear chance is left to the jury on a general verdict, and
a verdict is returned for the plaintiff, an appeal by the
defendant with a possibility of a new trial is most likely.
On the other hand, if the case is submitted on special
questions, the jury may by its answers find negligence by
the defendant and none by the plaintiff, so that the last
clear chance issue becomes immaterial and the judgment
entered by the court for the-plaintiff on the basis of the
answers could not be disturbed on that ground. The fol-
lowing example shows how such special questions might
be submitted.
"Gentlemen of the Jury:
"In giving you my instructions on this case, I wish to
emphasize that what I shall say about the law is binding
upon you, but what I shall say about the facts and about
the witnesses is purely advisory, and not in any way bind-
ing upon you. It is your function to decide upon the truth
of the testimony, as given by the various witnesses, and
whatever I say on the facts will be only for the purpose
of making the issues clearer and not with any idea of in-
fluencing your decision on them. That is your responsi-
bility.
"This case will be submitted to you on special questions
in place of a general verdict. In other words instead of
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finding for one side. or the other, you will be asked to
answer these four specific questions1 on the case:
"1. Was the accident in this case caused by the negli-
gence of the defendant?
"2. Did negligence of the plaintiff contribute to the
accident?
"3. Notwithstanding any negligence of the plaintiff,
did the motorman have a last clear chance to avoid the
accident by the use of ordinary care?
"4. What is the amount of the damages of the plain-
tiff?
"On the basis of your answers I will then enter judg-
ment for the proper party according to the law.
"To answer these questions, which I will take up indi-
vidually in a moment, you will have to decide how the
accident happened. As you know from the testimony, the
stories of the parties are conflicting on that.
"The plaintiff says that he came east on Fleet Street and
turned north on Broadway in order to find a place to park
his car; that he drove north on the car tracks for approx-
imately one hundred and fifty feet, and then saw a free
parking space on his left in the area between the north
and southbound tracks which, at that point, are some
distance apart on account of the market. He turned the
nose of his automobile towards the empty parking space,
and proceeded to go forward and backward on the tracks
in order to get into it, when he was suddenly struck by
a street car which came north from Fleet Street, and col-
lided with the left side of his automobile. The collision
damaged his automobile, and injured him personally. He
says that he knew the car was coming, because he had
seen it in his mirror, but when he started his maneuvers
of parking, the street car was some distance away, and
although he heard the bell of the street car being rung,
he says he had ample time to park before the car reached
him, or the trolley car had ample time to stop after he had
started to park.
:'These issues are based upon those suggested by Ion. John W. Staton
in his Address in 1929 as President of the Maryland State Bar Associa-
tion urging the use of special questions for submitting the case to the
jury (34 Proceedings, Md. State Bar Ass'n. 34). See also the examples
in "Operation of the Modified Special Verdict in Civil Actions in North
Carolna" by Francis E. Winslow, Esq., at page 58 of this issue of the
RENEW. Experience elsewhere has shown the vital importance of
keeping the questions simple and direct and of avoiding subtle or tech-
nical criticism of their form.
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"The story told by the motorman is entirely different.
It is simply that while the motorman was proceeding north
on Broadway, the plaintiff was ahead of him and a little
to the right; that suddenly, and without any warning, the
plaintiff cut across to the left and in front of the street
car when the motorman had no time to stop, and the
trolley car collided with the automobile.
"You must decide which of these two conflicting stories
is correct, and by your answers say which of the parties
was negligent. In deciding which story you believe, and
in making up your minds as to what actually happened,
you are entitled to use your experience as intelligent men,
and to judge the testimony of the witnesses as you would
judge matters in which you yourself are interested. In
other words, you can take into consideration what the
witnesses say; its probability; their manner in saying it,
and your understanding of the whole situation. You do
not have to be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt, but
in order to accept the story of the one who has the burden
of proof, you must be convinced that there is more per-
suasive evidence for it than against it.
"The first question is as follows:
"1. Was the accident in this case caused by the
negligence of the defendant?"
"What do we mean by "negligence"? Negligence is
lack of ordinary care under all the circumstances. It is
the failure to act with the care which a reasonable and
prudent man would have used under the same conditions.
"To be more specific, every person using the streets
has the duty to conduct himself prudently and to act with
ordinary care. Therefore the Railway Company owed it
to the plaintiff to operate its cars with reasonable care.
Consequently if you believe that the trolley car involved
in this accident was operated at an excessive speed, or
otherwise imprudently, then the defendant was negligent,
and you should answer the first question yes'.
"The burden of convincing you that this was the case
is on the plaintiff. He has charged that the defendant's
motorman was negligent, and he must prove that negli-
gence by the greater weight of the evidence. The weight
of the evidence is not measured by the number of wit-
nesses, or by any particular circumstance. It means
simply that the evidence for one party must carry more
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conviction to your minds than that for the other party, so
that if you can not make up your minds as to which story
is the more convincing, you must decide as though the
point in question had not been proved. Thus, if your
minds are in even balance as to whether the motorman
was negligent or not, then you must decide that he was
not, and must answer this question "No".
"On this question, therefore, if you believe from the
greater weight of the evidence that the motorman was not
operating the street car with reasonable care and prudence,
you should answer "Yes". Otherwise answer it "No".
"The second question is:
"2. Did negligence of the plaintiff contribute to
the accident?"
"It is the duty of a motorist, just as much as of a street-
car to drive with ordinary care and prudence, when using
the streets. If he fails to do so, then he is negligent. For
example, if a motorist makes a sharp turn across the path
of a trolley car in a careless or imprudent manner so that
the motorman could not stop before a collision when oper-
ating with ordinary care, then the motorist is negligent.
If you believe that the plaintiff in this case operated his
car negligently in this or any other manner, and helped
thereby to cause the accident, you must answer this ques-
tion "Yes". It makes no difference whether the plaintiff
was only slightly negligent, or was very negligent, for the
law does not consider quantities of negligence. Even if
you find that the plaintiff was only slightly negligent, your
answer should still be "Yes". But if you believe that the
plaintiff was not negligent, your answer should be "No".
"On this issue, the burden of proof is on the defendant
Railway Company. It must convince you by the greater
weight of the evidence that the plaintiff's own negligence
contributed to this accident. If you are so convinced,
answer this question "Yes". But if you believe that the
plaintiff was driving his car with reasonable care and
prudence, or if you are uncertain whether he was or not,
then answer it "No".
"The third question is:
"3. Notwithstanding any negligence of the plain-
tiff, did the motorman have a last clear chance to avoid
the accident by the use of ordinary care?"
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"If in answering the second question you have decided
that the plaintiff here was not negligent in operating his
automobile and therefore answer the second question
"No", you need not answer this question. But if you de-
cided that the plaintiff was negligent and answered "Yes"
to the second question, you must also answer this one.
"To answer this question you must decide whether the
motorman had what is known as a "last clear chance" to
prevent the accident. I can best explain what this means
concretely as applied to this case. Even though the plain-
tiff himself had been negligent before the accident in plac-
ing his automobile across the street car tracks, there may
still have been time for the motorman to have stopped
before running into him. It may be that with ordinary
care the motorman should have seen that the plaintiff was
in a dangerous position which he could not get out of in
time, and that if the motorman had used ordinary care
he could have stopped the trolley car before the collision.
If you believe that the motorman had such a last chance
to avoid the accident, then answer this question "Yes".
"The burden of proving that the motorman had such a
last clear chance to avoid the accident by ordinary care,
notwithstanding the plaintiff's previous conduct, is on the
plaintiff. If you are convinced by the greater weight of
the evidence, that the motorman had a last clear chance
and failed to take it, answer this question "Yes". If you
are not convinced, or your minds are in even balance on
the question, answer it "No".
"The fourth question is:
"4. What is the amount of the damages of the
plaintiff?"
"In answering this question, you may consider the fol-
lowing items:
"The plaintiff's health before the accident as compared
with since; whether his injury has affected his earning
capacity, and whether it will be permanent. You may also
allow him for his medical expenses, and the damage to his
automobile, on both of which points there is testimony in
the case. Finally, you may allow him such amount as you
think proper for the pain and suffering which he has en-
dured. The law gives no exact measure for pain and suf-
fering, and you must fix the damages, including that item,
in such amount as you think fair to both parties.
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"The object in thus submitting the case to you upon
special questions is to clarify the issues which you are to
decide and not to mystify you as to the result. As I said
at the beginning the result will depend on the answers
you give and counsel in their arguments to you will be
free to indicate and explain to you the effect of the various
answers which you may make.
"I will now ask counsel to come into my chambers to
discuss any other instructions before they make their argu-
ments to you."
GENERAL RULES OF PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE
PART ONE.
General Rule
Except as modified or superseded by the following
rules, all existing general and local statutes and rules of
the Court of Appeals regulating practice and procedure in
civil cases at law and in equity in courts of record in this
State are hereby adopted as general rules of the Court of
Appeals, pursuant to its powers under Section 35 of Article
26 of the Annotated Code of Maryland (1939 Edition). As
used in this rule the terms "practice and procedure" shall
include all matters and subjects on which the Court of
Appeals is authorized to prescribe general rules by Section
35 of said Article 26.
PART Two.
Rules Applicable to Law and Equity
I. DEPOSITIONS.
RULE 1. DEPOSITIONS PENDING PROCEEDINGS.
At any time after jurisdiction has been obtained over
any defendant or over property which is the subject of the
proceeding, any party to any proceeding may, without
leave of court, cause the testimony of any person, whether
a party or not, to be taken by deposition upon oral exami-
nation or written interrogatories for the purpose of dis-
covery or for use as evidence in the proceeding or for both
purposes: The deposition of a person confined in prison
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